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Nuclear sharing is a concept in NATO and Russia's policies of nuclear deterrence, which allows member countries without of their own to participate in the planning, training, and, in extremis, the use of nuclear weapons. In particular, it provides for involvement of the military of those countries in the nuclear sharing arrangements for delivering nuclear weapons in the event of the authorization for their use by the head of state of the nuclear possessor country. Nuclear stationing is the foreign deployment of nuclear weapons without direct cooperation from the host country's military.
As part of nuclear sharing, the participating countries carry out consultations and make common decisions on nuclear weapons policy, training, and deployment, and maintain technical equipment (notably nuclear-capable airplanes) required for the delivery of nuclear weapons. Some of these states also allow the nuclear weapon state to store nuclear weapons on their territory. In case of war, the United States publicly stated (and the negotiating parties agreed) that the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) would no longer be controlling.
Types
Nuclear sharing
Non-substantive
In the modern form, via the usage of permissive action links (PALs) , including anti-tampering systems, a host country is prevented from unilaterally detonating its shared weapons, on a short timeframe. This applies to currently shared United States and Russian weapons.
Due to the lack of transfer of operational control, this has been described by scholars as
non-substantive nuclear sharing.
Substantive
Historically, before the introduction of PALs in 1962, the US was aware that stationing or sharing agreements were insufficient to prevent host militaries from unilaterally seizing and using nuclear launch capabilities. Memorandums show that president Dwight D. Eisenhower's goal was to “give, to all intents and purposes, control of American weapons” to European allies and for the US to “retain titular possession only.” This has been described by scholars as
substantive nuclear sharing. One example was the simple dual-key operation of PGM-17 Thor IRBMs in the United Kingdom under
Project Emily. The Royal Air Force officer key began the missile launch sequence, and the United States Air Force officer key armed the warhead, with no real protection from British seizure of the American key.
Nuclear stationing
In contrast to nuclear sharing, foreign deployment of nuclear weapons and delivery systems, without cooperation from the host country's military, is termed
nuclear stationing. This was the most common type of arrangement throughout the
Cold War, including all foreign deployment by the USSR,
and all US deployments in Asia and in European countries without sharing arrangements. Such early deployments were often highly secretive, with host governments sometimes not being informed entirely.
Technology transfer
A separate but related concept is
nuclear weapons technology transfer, where a state is provided with assistance to develop an independent nuclear arsenal. Examples include French collaboration with the Israeli nuclear program, Soviet collaboration with the Chinese nuclear program, Chinese collaboration with the Pakistani nuclear program., and US-UK bilateral assistance after 1957.
NATO
Historical
assigned to NORAD, firing an inert version of the AIR-2 Genie nuclear-armed air-to-air missile in 1982]]Of the three nuclear powers in NATO (
France, the
United Kingdom and the
United States), only the United States is known to have provided weapons for nuclear sharing. However, the UK also deployed, stationed, or tested nuclear weapons on the territory of other states, and France tested nuclear weapons on the territory of Algeria, then a colony. The United States began moving weapons to Europe in 1954, first to the UK, and then to West Germany. The US negotiated agreements with the Allied countries where US nuclear weapons would be stored, including Section 144b of the Atomic Energy Act, and a national stockpile agreement. It also negotiated additional agreements with France, West Germany, Belgium, Netherlands, Canada, and the UK for the use of nuclear weapons stored and controlled by US forces in West Germany. These arrangements included delivery of short-range nuclear weapons - including landmines, rockets, and artillery, as well as nuclear armed depth charges and anti-aircraft missiles. The US also negotiated a separate agreement with Canada to provide nuclear-armed anti-air and anti-ship weapons to defend North America. The US deployed nuclear forces in Greenland (Danish territory) and Iceland - as well as extensively in the Pacific theater, but these were solely for delivery by US troops.
Historically, the shared nuclear weapon delivery systems were not restricted to bombs. Greece used Nike-Hercules Missiles as well as A-7 Corsair II attack aircraft. Canada had Bomarc nuclear-armed anti-aircraft missiles, Honest John surface-to-surface missiles and the AIR-2 Genie nuclear-armed air-to-air rocket, as well as tactical nuclear bombs for the CF-104 fighter.
After the Soviet Union collapsed, the nuclear weapon types shared within NATO were reduced to tactical nuclear bombs deployed by Dual-Capable Aircraft (DCA).
Weapon types
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Current:
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Former:
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AIR-2 Genie (Canada)
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B57 nuclear bomb (Canada, United Kingdom, and West Germany)
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B28 nuclear bomb (Canada, and the United Kingdom)
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B43 nuclear bomb (Canada, United Kingdom)
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B61 nuclear bomb (Greece)
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BGM-109G Ground Launched Cruise Missile (Belgium, Italy, Netherlands, United Kingdom, and West Germany)
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CIM-10 Bomarc (Canada)
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Mark 7 nuclear bomb (United Kingdom)
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Mk 101 Lulu (Netherlands and the United Kingdom)
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MGR-1 Honest John (Belgium, Canada, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Turkey, United Kingdom, and West Germany)
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MGM-1 Matador (West Germany)
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MGM-5 Corporal (United Kingdom)
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MGM-29 Sergeant (West Germany)
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MGM-52 Lance (Belgium, Italy, Netherlands, United Kingdom, and West Germany)
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MIM-14 Nike Hercules (Belgium, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Turkey, and West Germany)
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Pershing 1 (West Germany)
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Pershing 1a (West Germany)
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PGM-17 Thor (United Kingdom)
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PGM-19 Jupiter (Italy and Turkey)
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UGM-27 Polaris (Italy)
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W33 and W48 Artillery Shells (Canada, Belgium, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Turkey, United Kingdom, and West Germany)
Current
+ United States Weapons Storage and Security Systems in Europe | Estimated weapons
!Host country dual-capable aircraft at base
!US dual-capable aircraft at base |
| 10-15 | General Dynamics F-16AM/BM Fighting Falcon | None |
| 10-15 | Panavia Tornado | None |
| | Araxos | 0 (reserve mission only) | General Dynamics F-16C/D Fighting Falcon | None |
| 20–30 | None | General Dynamics F-16C/D Fighting Falcon |
| 10–15 | Panavia Tornado | None |
| 10-15 | General Dynamics F-16AM/BM Fighting Falcon | None |
| 20–30 | General Dynamics F-16C/D Fighting Falcon | None |
| RAF Lakenheath | 25-30 | None | Lockheed Martin F-35A Lightning II
McDonnell Douglas F-15E Strike Eagle |
| Total | 125-130 | |
, Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Turkey, and the United Kingdom have been hosting U.S. nuclear weapons as part of NATO's nuclear sharing policy.
Canada hosted weapons under the control of the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), rather than NATO, until 1984, and
Greece until 2001.
The United Kingdom also received U.S. tactical nuclear weapons such as nuclear artillery and Lance missiles until 1992, even though the UK is a nuclear-weapon state in its own right; these were mainly deployed in
Germany.
In peacetime, the nuclear weapons stored in non-nuclear countries are guarded by United States Air Force (USAF) personnel and previously, some nuclear artillery and missile systems were guarded by United States Army (USA) personnel; the Permissive Action Link codes required for arming them remain under American control. In case of war, the weapons are to be mounted on the participating countries' warplanes. The weapons are under custody and control of USAF Munitions Support Squadrons co-located on NATO main operating bases who work together with the host nation forces.
, 100 tactical B61 nuclear bombs are believed to be deployed in Europe under the nuclear sharing arrangement.
Italy
In Italy, B61 bombs are stored at the Ghedi Air Base and at the Aviano Air Base. According to the former Italian President Francesco Cossiga, Italy's role in a planned retaliation consisted in striking with those nuclear weapons
Czechoslovakia and
Hungary had the
Warsaw Pact waged nuclear war against NATO.
[Interview to Cossiga on Blu notte – Misteri italiani, episode " OSS, CIA, GLADIO, i Rapporti Segreti tra America e Italia" of 2005] He acknowledged the presence of U.S. nuclear weapons in Italy, and speculated about the possible presence of British and French nuclear weapons.
Germany
The only German nuclear base is located in Büchel Air Base, near the border with Luxembourg. The base has 11 Protective Aircraft Shelters (PAS) equipped with WS3 Vaults for storage of nuclear weapons, each with a maximum capacity of 44 B61 nuclear bombs. There are 20 B61 bombs stored on the base for delivery by German PA-200
Tornado IDS bombers of the JaBoG 33 squadron. The Tornado IDS aircraft were due to be retired by the end of 2024; while 2010 and 2018 assessments questioned what nuclear sharing role, if any, Germany would then retain,
in 2020 Germany (Fourth Merkel cabinet) announced that it would buy 30 Boeing F/A-18E/F Super Hornets to replace the Tornado in its nuclear-capable role.
The Super Hornet was not yet certified for the B61 bomb, but Dan Gillian, head of Boeing's Super Hornet program, had previously stated his optimism about achieving this certification in a timely manner.
In 2022, against the backdrop of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the Super Hornet order was cancelled and Germany (
Kabinett Scholz) instead chose to order 35 Lockheed Martin F-35 jets for nuclear sharing use.
Netherlands
On 10 June 2013, former Dutch prime minister
Ruud Lubbers confirmed the existence of 22 shared nuclear bombs at Volkel Air Base.
This was inadvertently confirmed again in June 2019 when a public draft report to the NATO Parliamentary Assembly was discovered to reference the existence of US nuclear weapons at Volkel, as well as locations in Belgium, Italy, Germany, and Turkey. A new version of the report was released on 11 July 2019 without reference to the locations of the weapons.
Turkey
In 2017 due to an increasingly unstable relationship between the United States and Turkey it was suggested that the United States consider removing 50 tactical nuclear weapons stored under American control at the Incirlik Air Base in Turkey.
The presence of US nuclear weapons in Turkey gained increased public attention in October 2019 with the deterioration of relations between the two nations after the Turkish military incursion into Syria.
United Kingdom
In July 2025, experts concluded that between 25 and 30 United States nuclear weapons had been redeployed to
RAF Lakenheath for the first time since 2008.
This was based on telemetry from a 15 July Boeing C-17 Globemaster III flight between New Mexico and the United Kingdom, as well as preparations for nuclear weapons storage at the base being documented since 2023.
The US and UK defense departments reiterated their policy to not confirm or deny nuclear weapon presence.
Polish aspirations
In 2022, after the Russian invasion of Ukraine, reports appeared about the possible inclusion of
Poland in the nuclear sharing policy, with president
Andrzej Duda calling the country's lack of nuclear weapons a "problem" and saying that it was in talks with the United States about the possibility of nuclear sharing.
In June 2023, then-prime minister Mateusz Morawiecki declared Poland's interest in hosting nuclear weapons under the policy, citing the reported deployment of Russian nuclear weapons to its Kaliningrad region and Belarus, while National Security Bureau head
Jacek Siewiera said the country was interested in certifying its upcoming F-35A fleet as being capable of delivering B61 bombs.
In April 2024, president Duda said that Poland was "ready" to host nuclear weapons and had been discussing the matter with the United States government for "some time".
The current Polish prime minister,
Donald Tusk, said that he wanted to speak with Duda to understand the intention behind the statement and that he wanted Poland to "be safe and well-armed, but he would also like any initiatives to be very well prepared by the people responsible for them and for all Poles to be convinced that this is what they want."
In May 2024, foreign minister Radosław Sikorski accused president Duda of failing to consult with him on this and other major foreign policy announcements and said that he had "asked the president privately and publicly not to discuss such delicate and secret matters in public, because it did not help Poland"; he also said that the previous Polish government had been told that the idea of Poland being involved with nuclear sharing was "not on the table".
After the announcement in March 2025 that France was considering the extension of its nuclear deterrence to other European countries (see next section), Duda welcomed this development
while simultaneously renewing his call for American weapons to be based in Poland.
Sharing of non-US weapons
In March 2025, amid European concerns over whether the United States could continue to be relied on as an ally, the French president
Emmanuel Macron said that his country would consider the possibility of extending the protection offered by its nuclear arsenal to other European states. Both Macron and defence minister Sébastien Lecornu stressed that ultimate control over the weapons would be retained by France, and claims that the potential decision amounted to a plan for nuclear sharing were explicitly denied.
said that discussions on nuclear sharing should be held with France and Britain (which also has nuclear weapons) but warned that European weapons could only ever be a supplement to the existing American arrangement.
Non-NATO
USSR
The Soviet Union practiced nuclear stationing during the Cold War, primarily with Warsaw Pact countries. It stationed nuclear weapons in
East Germany,
, Hungary,
Poland,
and Mongolia, as well as briefly in Cuba during the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis.
It is possible that similar arrangements were made with Bulgaria, but no sources have been found to date.
Russia–Belarus nuclear weapons sharing
On 27 February 2022, shortly after the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, Belarusians voted in a constitutional referendum with political and military reforms, including to repeal the post-Soviet constitutional prohibition on basing of nuclear weapons. The reforms also removed the country's
Neutral country and allowed permanent basing for the Russian Armed Forces.
The referendum was criticized by the EU, UK, US, Canada, and other countries in the context of the censorship and human rights violations against the Belarusian opposition.
At a meeting on 25 June 2022, Russian President Vladimir Putin and President of Belarus Alexander Lukashenko agreed the deployment of Russian short-range nuclear-capable missiles.
, there is no conclusive open-source evidence that Russian nuclear warheads and gravity bombs themselves are being stored in Belarus, although the most likely location if so is a Cold War-era depot near Asipovichy. In December 2024, Lukashenko stated Belarus was hosting "dozens" of Russian warheads. Putin has also stated that its Oreshnik intermediate-range ballistic missile could be deployed to Belarus in the second half of 2025, and that Belarus would play a role in nuclear targeting.
Despite Lukashenko's statement on weapon usage "without hesitation in case of aggression against Belarus", which could indicate the transfer of operational control to Belarus, Putin emphasized Russian control was maintained, and General Secretary of the CIS Sergey Lebedev described a "double nuclear button" for weapon usage.
Potential nuclear sharing between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia
It is common belief among foreign officials that
Saudi Arabia and
Pakistan have an understanding in which Pakistan would supply Saudi Arabia with warheads if security in the
Persian Gulf was threatened. A Western official told
The Times that Saudi Arabia could have the nuclear warheads in a matter of days of approaching Pakistan. Pakistan's ambassador to Saudi Arabia, Muhammed Naeem Khan, was quoted as saying, "Pakistan considers the security of Saudi Arabia not just as a diplomatic or an internal matter but as a personal matter." Naeem also said that the Saudi leadership considered Pakistan and Saudi Arabia to be one country and that any threat to Saudi Arabia is also a threat to Pakistan.
Other vendors were also likely to enter into a bidding war if Riyadh indicated that it was seeking nuclear warheads. Both Saudi Arabia and Pakistan have denied the existence of any such agreement.
Western intelligence sources have told
The Guardian that "the Saudi monarchy paid for up to 60% of the Pakistani nuclear programme, and in return has the option to buy a small nuclear arsenal ('five to six warheads') off the shelf".
Saudi Arabia has potential dual-purpose delivery infrastructure, including
Panavia Tornado and F-15S fighter bombers and improved Chinese CSS-2 intermediate range ballistic missiles with accuracy sufficient for nuclear warheads but delivered with high explosive warheads.
[de Borchgrave, Arnaud, "Pakistan, Saudi Arabia in secret nuke pact: Islamabad trades weapons technology for oil" , The Washington Times, 22 October 2003.][ "Saudi Arabia Special Weapons" , globalsecurity.org.]
In November 2013, a variety of sources told Newsnight that Saudi Arabia was able to obtain nuclear weapons from Pakistan at will. The new-report further stated, according to western experts, it was alleged that Pakistan's defense sector, including its missile and defense labs, had received plentiful financial assistance from Saudi Arabia.[ Amos Yadlin, formerly head of Israeli military intelligence, said "They already paid for the bomb, they will go to Pakistan and bring what they need to bring."]
According to the US-based Center for Strategic and International Studies think-thank, the BBC's report on possible Pakistani-Saudi nuclear sharing was partially incorrect. There was no indication of the validity or credibility of the BBC's sources, and the article failed to expand on what was essentially an unverified lead. Furthermore, if Pakistan were to transfer nuclear warheads onto Saudi soil, it was highly unlikely that either nation would face any international repercussions if NATO-esque guidelines were followed.[Deming, Kyle, "No Price is Right: Why the BBC is Incorrect about a Saudi Arabia-Pakistan Nuclear Weapons Deal" , Project on Nuclear Weapons, 13 November 2013.] A research paper produced by the British House of Commons Defence Select Committee states that as long as current NATO nuclear sharing arrangements remain in place, the NATO states would have few valid grounds for complaint if such a transfer were to occur.
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty considerations
In 2015, Russia accused the US of violating the NPT,
At the time the NPT was being negotiated, the NATO nuclear sharing agreements were well known and discussed publicly in the United Nations at the NPT negotiations in Geneva,
See also
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US–UK Mutual Defence Agreement
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United States military deployments around the world
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U.S. nuclear weapons in Japan
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Taiwan and weapons of mass destruction
Notes
External links
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Negotiations of Articles I and II the NPT Vol. 1 (1961-1966) , NATO Archives, Brussels
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Negotiations of Articles I and II the NPT Vol. 2 (1966-1969) , NATO Archives, Brussels
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Mohamed Shaker, The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, Origin and Implementation 1959-1979, Volumes I-III,, Oceana Publications, London 1980
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NATO Nuclear Sharing, Tim Street, Oxford Research Group, ORG Explains No. 5, June 2018
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U.S. Nuclear Weapons in Europe, Hans M. Kristensen, Natural Resources Defense Council, February 2005
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NATO and Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament, NATO, July 2024
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North Atlantic Council Statement on the 50th Anniversary of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, NATO Headquarters, 5 March 2020
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United States Air Forces in Europe – Munitions Support Squadron, GlobalSecurity.org
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A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945–1963 (Chapter 5: Eisenhower and Nuclear Sharing), Marc Trachtenberg, 1999, Princeton University Press,
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Commitment to purpose : how alliance partnership won the cold war, Richard L. Kugler, RAND, MC-190-RC/FF, 1993,
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The Woodrow Wilson Center's Nuclear Proliferation International History Project or NPIHP is a global network of individuals and institutions engaged in the study of international nuclear history through archival documents, oral history interviews and other empirical sources.
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Soviet Nuclear Weapons in Hungary 1961–1991
